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Summary findings
By explicitly accounting for the interaction betveen  compared with the optimal taxation benchmark without
importers and corrupt customs officials, Gatti argues that  corruption.
setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public  A similar argument applies when customs officials
officials' ability to extract bribes from importers.  offer to classify  goods into low-tariff categories in
If the government's main objective is to raise revenues  exchange for a bribe.
at the minimum cost to welfare, optimally-set tariff rates  Setting trade tariffs at a uniform level eliminates
will be inversely proportional  to the elasticity of demand  officials' opportunities to extract rents. Thus, when
for imports. So they will generally differ across goods.  corruption is pervasive, a uniform tariff can deliver more
Such a menu of tariff rates endows customs officials  government revenues and welfare than the optimally set
with the opportunity to extract rent from importers. If  (Ramsey) tariff benchmark.
officials have enough discretionary power, they might  The empirical evidence confirms that these
threaten to misclassify goods into more heavily taxed  considerations are relevant to policymaking, since a
categories unless importers pay them a bribe. Because of  robust association between the standard deviation of
the bribe, the effective tariff rate for the importing firm  trade tariffs  - a measure of the diversification of tariff
increases, so demand for the good decreases.  menus - and corruption emerges across countries.
The resulting drop in import demand implies an
efficiency loss as well as lower government revenues,
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"If I am born again, I want to come back as
a custom official "  2
Anonymous  Thai businessman
The issue of a uniform tariff across goods has received substantial attention by both
economists and policymakers. Among other things, uniform tariffs have been shown to
reduce  gains  from  lobbying  for  protection  and  thus  enhance  economic  efficiency,
increase the  cost  to  future governments of  protecting favored  sectors, and  in general
improve transparency. Notwithstanding its appeal and simplicity, only few countries -
Bolivia, Chile, and to some extent Mexico - have so far opted for a uniform trade tax
structure. 3
Besides  likely political obstacles to its implementation, the case for uniform tariffs
appears to be weakened  if the government's  main objective is raising revenues. From
optimal taxation theory we know that revenues can be raised at the minimum efficiency
cost by taxing at higher rates goods with  less elastic demand schedules. Optimally set
tariff rates would therefore generally differ across goods.
In this work,  we show how explicitly accounting for possible interactions between
importers and customs officials might alter the normative prescription of optimal taxation
theory. In particular, we show that, if the government's  objective is to raise revenue at the
minimum cost in terms of efficiency, and customs officials are corrupt, a uniform tariff
may be preferable to differentiated tariffs, because it may yield the government  higher
revenues as well as improve welfare.
Whenever tariffs differ across goods, the wedge between them gives customs officials
room  to  extract  rents  from  importers.  Corrupt  officials might  threaten  to  misclassify
imports into more  heavily taxed  categories  unless the  importers agree  to  pay them a
bribe. Alternatively, the officials might offer to misclassify goods into less heavily taxed
categories in exchange for bribes. We will see that this interaction gives rise to resource
transfers among the players and to government revenue losses. Moreover, whenever the
2I  thank David  Dollar  for this illuminating  quote.
3 See  Panagariya  and Rodrick  (1993)  for an in-depth  discussion  of these  issues.
2bribe increases the effective price paid by importers, import quantity decreases and so
does welfare. Finally, the likely bargaining between officials and importers to reach an
agreement can be time-consuming and wasteful in itself.
The flexibility of taxing goods at different rates comes therefore at a cost in terms of
efficiency,  revenues,  and  time,  if  officials  are  corrupt. By  restricting  the  ability of
customs  officials  to  appropriate  government  revenues  and  to  impose  unnecessary
efficiency losses on the economy, a uniform tariff structure can instead deliver higher
revenues and welfare.
Empirical  evidence confirms that  the  diversification  of trade  tariffs  across  goods
might actually fuel corruption, in that  a measure of such diversification - the standard
deviation of trade tariffs across goods - appears to be robustly associated with reported
corruption across countries.
This argument is relevant to policy in many countries. A standard recommendation to
developing  countries  is  to  shift  away  from  protectionist  regimes  in  order  to  obtain
efficiency gains  (see  for example Thomas and Nash  1991). Often  these countries are
reluctant to decrease tariff barriers because of the implied fiscal  revenue loss. To the
extent  that  customs  administrations  are  plagued  by corruption  and  customs  officials
appropriate government revenues in the way we described, shifting trade tariffs towards a
uniform low  level could  allow countries  to  obtain efficiency gains  without  incurring
major revenue losses.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two develops a simple graphical argument
illustrating  the  main  points.  Section  three  presents  the  empirical  test.  Section  four
concludes.
2. Optimal Trade Tariffs ai la Ramsey and Corruption
Consider a small open economy where importers are price takers and trade tariffs are
set to maximize welfare subject to the constraint that the government raises some revenue
R. This is a standard optimal taxation type problem, first formulated by Frank Ramsey. In
a two-good world, the government will choose tariffs ti, and t2 to  maximize the indirect
utility from good 1 and good 2, v),  subject to the constraint of raising revenue R
3max  v(p, + t,, P2 + t2 ; m)
ti .t2
s.t.  t,x,(p,  + t,,m)  + t2x,(p,  + t,,m)  2 R
where p, and ti are respectively price and tariff rate of good i, m is income, and xi is the
import demand for good i.
The  solution to  this  problem implies that  tariffs  on  each good  will be  set  to  be
inversely  proportional  to  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  (  4).  4  Therefore,  t'  =  - and
to=k
2  -,  where k is a constant and the superscript o stands for optimally set tariffs. If &1  >
82
62, then t  <K  1'
Let us also label  x'  and  x2  the levels of import chosen by firm 1 and firm 2  when
market prices for good 1 and good 2 are pi and P2 and tariffs are set as above.
Suppose now that good I  and good 2 are sufficiently similar that their classification
as "good I " and "good 2" is not crystal clear. Dishonest customs officials might then try
to exploit the wedge between the tariff rates by (a) threatening to classify good 1 as the
more heavily taxed good 2 unless paid a bribe or (b) offering to classify good 2 as the less
heavily taxed good 1 in exchange for a bribe. 5 In other words, the Ramsey tariff structure
endows corrupt customs officials with a form of rent.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of interactions (a)  and (b) - which we label "threat"
and "lure" respectively - between customs officials and importers. In the picture, xi(pi)
and x2(p 2) are demand schedules for import goods I and 2, with price elasticities S1  >  62.
Because of this, we saw that optimally set tariffs are such that t,  < t.
In both  scenarios, bargaining  is likely to  take  place and the bribe will tend to  be
smaller  than  the  full  difference  between  the  tariff  rates  t'  and  Ii".  However,  for
simplicity, we abstract for now from the dynamics of the bargaining process and assume
that the official is able to twist it to her complete favor and can therefore appropriate the
entire rent.
4  See  Varian  (1992)  for a standard  proof of the argument.
In this work,  we restrict  the attention  to misclassification  of import  categories  and assume  away  the
possibility  that customs  officials  collude  with  importers  to smuggle  import quantities.
4The effects of corruption are easily seen in the "threat" case. Because of the bribe, the
effective price paid by firm I for its good increases. This in turn drives down demand so
that only  ix < x'  is imported. As a result of the shrinking tax base, the government loses
(x, - ij)t'  in revenues.  The official appropriates  (tf  - t')X1 of the importers'  surplus.
Finally,  Y2(to  -to  )(x-,  - - represented in Figure  1 by the triangle CDE - is lost in
firm surplus altogether. When compared to the no-tariff situation, the overall efficiency
loss implied by the imposition of tariff t'  augmented by the bribe amounts to the triangle
AFE and is analogous to the effect of setting the tariff on good I to t2
In the "lure" scenario, under the assumption that the official pockets the full rent, the
effect of corruption  is a  straightforward transfer of  revenues from the government  to
customs officials. The final price of the good, and thus the imported quantity  x2,  stay
unchanged and no efficiency loss ensues.
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(a) The "threat" case  (b) The "lure" case
Figure 1
The  impact of  corruption  is  now  apparent: an  efficiency  loss accompanied  by  a
revenue loss (in the  "threat"  case) and  a transfer  of  resources  from the  firm (in  the
"threat" case) and from the government (in the "lure"  case) to the officials. To the extent
that the government  must raise other, possibly more distortionary, taxes to  recover the
5revenue  loss,  the  resource transfer  away  from  the  government  can  imply  a  further
efficiency loss per se.
It  is easy now to  see how a different balance of power in the bargaining between
importers and customs officials might modify the payoffs for the three agents in play. In
the "threat" case, if importers and officials split returns 50-50, the effective tariff faced by
the importer is t"-" = 2(t'  + t').  Expected imported quantity of good 1, x,0- 0, will be
lower than the quantity  associated with  the  optimal tariff  t'  without  corruption, but
higher than the quantity prevailing if the official were to pocket the whole surplus. This
implies, in turn, that the government loses relatively less revenues and also that less is
lost in welfare, compared to the case where the full rent accrues to the official.
If payoffs are split 50-50 in the "lure" case, the firm faces a reduced effective tariff
rate. This drives up imported quantity of good 2 and, because of this, both welfare and
government  revenues increase  relative to  the  case where the  full rent  accrues to  the
official.
The comparison of the "threat" and  "lure"  interactions under  the 50-50 bargaining
rule with the Ramsey benchmark without corruption is likely to  produce less startling
differences than the case where officials pocket the full rent. Nonetheless, the spirit of the
results - that these interactions imply government revenue and possibly welfare losses -
stays unchanged.
We carried out this analysis under the implicit assumption that the government does
not monitor custom officials. Reversing this assumption would not substantially change
the  analysis but  would  introduce  complications.  Monitoring is likely  to  decrease the
ability of officials to appropriate government resources - or force them to share the spoils
with the monitors - and to impose the distortions we described. Nonetheless, evaluating
the  impact of  monitoring would entail weighing its benefits against  costs in terms of
additional taxation the government must impose to finance it.
3. The Case of a Uniform Tariff
Consider now the case of a uniform tariff set, for instance, at tu = ti'. As illustrated in
figure 2, with this tariff structure firm 1 imports x'  = x',  while firm 2 imports x2 > xo.
6P 2+t 2
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Figure 2: The uniform tariff
When compared with Ramsey's  benchmark, the uniform tariff  induces two effects.
First, the lower tariff on good 2 increases its demand, thereby generating an efficiency
gain  and  an  improvement  in  revenues  due  to  the  increase  in  the  tax  base.  Second,
government revenues decrease because good 2 is subject to a lower tax rate. When these
two  effects are weighed against each other, the Ramsey tariff without  corruption not
surprisingly dominates the uniform tariff-  after all, Ramsey's  is the optimal tariff.
However, when compared with Ramsey taxation with corrupt custom officials (the
"threat" and "lure" cases combined), the uniform tariff delivers both higher revenues and
a welfare improvement. With a uniform tariff, customs officials have no opportunity to
misclassify goods and thereby no  possibility to  divert revenues from  the government.
Moreover, both goods are subject to lower effective tariff rates, which implies increased
demand for the goods, and an improvement in both efficiency and government revenues.
Table  1 summarizes  the  "threat"  and  the  "lure"  effects  and  reports  payoffs  for
government, officials, and importers under Ramsey tariffs - with and without corruption
- and under  the uniform  tariff  rate.
4. The Empirical Test
The argument  developed  above  suggests that  countries with  highly  differentiated
trade tariffs across goods should ceteris paribus be more vulnerable to corruption.
7It is interesting to see whether this conjecture stands empirical investigation. Relating
some measure of corruption in the customs with the standard deviation of trade tariffs
across countries provides a natural and simple way test for the claim.
The Global Competitiveness  Survey  1998 reports  a  measure  of corruption  where
customs related bribery is explicitly  accounted for.  A low value  of the index (GCS),
which  ranges  from  1 to  7,  indicates  "irregular,  additional payments  connected  with
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection  or  loan  applications".  This  index  is  be  particularly  informative  for  our
purposes since is constructed on the basis of a survey of local entrepreneurs who are the
likely players in the interactions we described.
The index covers 72 countries and is available for 1997 or 1998.
Standard deviations of trade tariffs (SDV)  are available from World Development
Indicators and UNCTAD for a total of 58 countries. Data are for 1998 or for the closest
year available.
GCS and SDV are jointly  available for only 35 countries, mostly of the developing
world. Figure 3 shows their plot.
A simple regression of GCS on  SDV, highlights the expected negative correlation
between the two indexes: the coefficient reported in column 1 of table 2 indicates that
higher  standard  deviations  of  trade  tariffs  are  significantly  associated  with  higher
measured corruption (lower values of GCS).
To correct for possible omitted variable bias on the estimated coefficient of SDV, we
include in the regression the natural logarithm of income (L_INCOME), to account for
the fact that corruption might  simply be  a function  of the level  of development  of a
country; and dummies indicating the legal origin of countries, to  capture the effect  of
structural differences in legal systems.
Finally, SDV might proxy not only for the diversification of tariffs across goods, but
also for the degree of uncertainty  surrounding the  imposition of trade taxes. To  avoid
misinterpretations of the estimated coefficient on SDV, we include a proxy for the degree
of uncertainty in the level of import taxes (UNCERTAINTY). 6
6 UNCERTAINTY  is constructed  to measure  the likelihood  of  future  changes  in the average  rate  of import
taxes  during  a 12  month  period.  UNCERTAINTY  ranges  from  0 to 100  and is available  for 102  countries.
See  Kaufmann  et al. 1999.
8When the controls are added, the negative relationship between GCS and SDV
persists,  though slightly  weakened.
A concern  in the interpretation  of the OLS coefficient  on SDV regards  the possibility
that a highly differentiated trade tariff menu may be endogenous  to  corruption.  It  is
indeed conceivable  that in a highly corrupted regime, powerful  customs administrators
might lobby for a tariff structure  that maximizes their bribe collection.  If this were the
case, the correlation  between GCS and SDV would then reflect a causality  running  from
corruption  to standard  deviation  and not vice versa,  as we argue  here.
To correct for this possible source of bias, we re-estimate  the relationship while
instrumenting  for the standard deviation of tariffs. Term of trade shocks (TTS) are a
promising  instrument.  Policymakers  are likely  to change  the tariff structure  in response  to
terms of trade shocks, thereby inducing a  correlation between TTS and the standard
deviation  of tariff rates. Moreover,  changes  in terms of trade are thought  of as exogenous
shocks  to the economy  and therefore are likely to be uncorrelated  with the error in our
main regression.  To be able to assess the lack of correlation  between the errors in the
regression  of interest and the instruments  through  the test of over-identifying  restrictions,
an additional  instrument  is included:  the average  Gini coefficient  at the beginning  of the
decade (from Deininger and Squire 1996). The two  instruments are  overall good
predictors  of the standard  deviation  of tariff rates, as highlighted  by the reported P-value
associated  with the F-test of joint significance of the  instruments  in  the first  stage
regression.  Moreover, the over-identifying  restriction  test indicates  that the instruments
are valid.
The results of the IV estimation  are reported in table 2, column 3. The association
between corruption and standard deviation of tariffs is  robust to  instrumenting and
significant.
Although  we cannot rule out that the GCS index is only an imperfect measure of
corruption in customs administration  and that the results of the estimation might be
driven by the limited number  of countries  for which the data are available,  the evidence
presented  here suggests an important  association  between diversification  of trade tariff
menus  and levels of corruption.
94. Conclusions
By explicitly accounting  for the interaction  between importers  and corrupt customs
officials,  we have shown that opting for a uniform tariff on import goods can deliver
higher revenues and welfare than optimally-set (Ramsey) tariffs when corruption is
pervasive.  This happens because uniform protection on imports restricts the ability of
customs  officials  to exploit  the wedge  between  tariff rates on different  goods and thereby
appropriate  government  revenues  and impose  efficiency  losses  on the economy.
An empirical test shows a robust association  between standard deviation of trade
tariffs and measured corruption across countries, suggesting  that a highly diversified
trade tariff menu might actually  fuel bribe  taking behavior.
The message  of this paper - that the government  faces a trade-off  between optimally-
set, differentiated  tax rates and the distortions that public officials can introduce by
exploiting  these differences  in the tax rates - can be readily  generalized  to other tax and
tariff setting  situations.
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11Figure 3. Correlation  between absence of corruption (GCS index) and  standard
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12Table 1. Government, firms, and custom officials payoffs under different regimes
Ramsey (optimal) tariff rates  Uniform tariff
Honest custom  Corrupt custom officials
officials
Threat  Lure  Threat and Lure
Government  t xl +  t0  x0x  + t2x2  toxl  + t  x2  to  I  + tC xtx'  + t  x2
Revenues  I  _  2  2  1  2  2  1  1  _1  2  1  +  2  +  2
Firm I  -t,  x,  - t2  x,  -I  x  2-  t  x,  -
Finn 2  - t°xi  -2  X2  2tx  -t°x°  -t  x2
Custom officials  0  (to  - Oil  (to  - to )x2  (to  - t  )( 1 + x2)  0
Welfare change
with  respect  to  (benchmark)  - ,(t2  - t'  X-Xl)  0  - (t2  -1t  XX} -Xl)  +  1  (t2-t 0 )(x2  -x2)
- Y  tX 1 12  0  22  122t)xu4
benchmark
Notation  is in reference  to figure  1. In the case  of Ramsey  taxation  with corrupt  customs officials,  payoffs  are  calculated  under  the
assumption that customs officials are able to capture the entire rent in the bargaining process with importers.Table 2. Absence of corruption and standard deviation of trade tariffs
Simple OLS  OLS with controls  2SLS
Standard deviation of trade tariffs  -0.05  -0.03  -0.13
(2.01)  (-1.412)  (-2.26)
DRI  0.02  0.02
(1.54)  (1.55)
Log of income  0.65  0.66
(2.733)  (1.73)
Legal origin: British  -0.01  0.76
(-0.046)  (1.26)
Legal origin: French  -0.92  -0.53
(-2.00)  (-0.73)
Legal origin: Socialist  -1.07  -0.36
(-2.78)  (-0.57)
Legal origin: Scandinavian  0.61  0.93
(2.2)  (1.43)
N  36  34  24
R2  0.08  0.74  0.63
Joint significance of instruments in  0.05
first stage regression
(P-value for F-test)
Over-identifying restrictions test  0.53
(P value)
t-statistics  are reported  in parentheses.  Standard  errors  are corrected  for heteroschedasticity.  German
legal origin is ornitted in columns (2) and (3). Terms of trade shocks in 1995 and average Gini
coefficient  for early 1  990s  are used  as instruments.Data Description
GCS  Irregular,  additional payments  connected with  import  and  export permits,
business licenses, exchange  controls, tax assessments,  police protection or
loan applications for the  years  1997/1998. Source: Global Competitiveness
Survey, The World Bank, 1999.
SDV_TARIFFS  Standard deviation of tariff rates. Source: World Development Indicators and
UNCTAD for Morocco, Pakistan, Switzerland.
INCOME  Natural  logarithm of real  income per  capita.  Source: World Development
Indicators, The World Bank.
LEGAL ORIGIN  Origin of a country legal system. Source: La Porta et al (1998).
UNCERTAINTY  Likelihood of a  10-percentage point increase in the average rate of import
taxes/tariffs  during  any  12  months.  Source:  Kaufmann  et  al.  (1999);
originally from Country Risk Services.
TOT95  Terms of trade shocks for 1995, calculated as
ioI(  *PX,p  I  )I  ,-  (jPM  t,-P*  j/IRGDP,-,,  where X,
M, RGDP are export, imports, and GDP in real tern-s (1987 prices), and PX,
PM are export and import prices, respectively.
GINI  Average  Gini coefficient  for early  nineties.  Source: Deininger  and  Squire
(1996).
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Country  GCS  SDV  Trade  policy  Legal  Origin
code  Uncertainty
British  French Socialist Gennan Scandinavian
ARG  3.3  6.9  82  0  1  0  0  0
AUS  6.3  7.4  95  1  0  0  0  0
AUT  6.3  8.7  95  0  0  0  1  0
BRA  3.6  7.3  20  0  1  0  0  0
CAN  6.4  26.5  90  1  0  0  0  0
CHE  6.4  5.7  95  0  0  0  1  0
CHL  5.7  0.7  92  0  1  0  0  0
CHN  3.2  13  72  0  0  1  0  0
COL  3.1  6.2  82  0  1  0  0  0
FIN  6.7  10.3  95  0  0  0  0  1
HUN  4.1  17  90  0  0  1  0  0
IDN  2.1  16.7  68  0  1  0  0  0
IND  2.8  14  65  1  0  0  0  0
JPN  6.0  7.7  98  0  0  0  1  0
MAR  4.4  22.65  82  0  1  0  0  0
MEX  3.8  13.5  97  0  1  0  0  0
NGA  2.4  30.8  60  1  0  0  0  0
NOR  7.0  16.5  95  0  0  0  0  1
NZL  6.6  6  95  1  0  0  0  0
PAK  2.3  22.13  68  1  0  0  0  0
PER  4.3  2.9  56  0  1  0  0  0
PHL  2.4  11.4  75  0  1  0  0  0
POL  4.1  28.1  88  0  0  1  0  0
RUS  3.0  8.4  70  0  0  1  0  0
SGP  6.4  2.7  92  1  0  0  0  0
SWE  6.4  4.8  95  0  0  0  0  1
THA  3.6  25  80  1  0  0  0  0
TUN  5.6  12.8  92  0  1  0  0  0
TUR  3.9  25.4  80  0  1  0  0  0
TWN  5.4  11  90
TZA  3.4  13.9  70  1  0  0  0  0
USA  6.3  11.8  90  1  0  0  0  0
VEN  2.6  6.1  70  0  1  0  0  0
ZMB  4.4  9.3  64  1  0  0  0  0
ZWE  3.7  17.8  61  1  0  0  0  0
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